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Abstract
The main focus of this paper is twofold. First is to design Pigouvian taxes for di¤erent
kinds of environmental external e¤ects on the market economy in order to be possible to
say what is the relevant information in each situation. Second is to address the question
of the welfare e¤ects of using close to Pigouvian taxes in real economies. This is done
by considering more general conditions than those used by Aronsson et al. (2003). In
particular, we take the ecosystem dynamics as being density dependent, and we assume
that there are errors in measuring both the consumers marginal utility of nature and its
regeneration rate. Additionally, we derive cost benet rules for a green tax reform on the
context of a two sector economy, in particular, a nal good sector and a knowledge sector,
considering two externalities - one environmental externality and one technology externality.
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1 Introduction
The literature on green accounting has grown enormously over the last few decades. Recent
times have witnessed a growing awareness of the interactions between economic, social and
environmental issues (Weitzman, 2003). There has appeared a widespread interest in the
idea of extending the concepts and measurement of national income to include important
nonmarket activities in related areas that a¤ect welfare and productivity - in particular,
environmental goods and services.
Many questions have been raised about augmented (or comprehensive) national income
accounting ranging from the broad concerns about its welfare foundations, to the basic
issues of the design of green national income accounts. As Weitzman (2003) puts it, at the
core of this branch of economic analysis runs a common strand attempting to connect a
currently observable index of comprehensive net national income or product (NNP) with
some appropriate but not observable welfare measure of future power to consume, which
typically has a sustainability-like avor. These ideas are close to the ideas of classic
economists such as Fisher, Lindahl, Hicks, Pigou, Hayek and many others interested in the
concept of income, and in linking this concept to other important concepts in capital theory
(Weitzman, 2003).
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Empirical attemps have also been made to improve the accounting practices by adding
imputed values for the depletion of natural capital to the net national product and con-
sumersvaluation of environmental services (Hartwick, 1990; Atkinson et al.1999; Perrings
and Vincent, 2003; Pezzey et al., 2005). Most studies are based on the paper by Weitzman
(1976), which showed that for the case of an economy with no technological progress and
with utility being equal to consumption, if this economy follows the optimal path, an aug-
mented net national product measure is directly proportional to the present value of future
utility of the representative consumer. This framework was then generalized to include
situations where natural resources are important parts of the economic system (Hartwick,
1990) or to include non-linear utility functions and consequently accounting for the con-
sumer surplus (Aronsson et al., 2003).
There are two main critiques made to green accounting and its relation to the sustain-
ability of dynamic economies. One relates to the theoretical results that state that (changes
in) hamiltonian measures are an indicator of (non-sustainability) welfare but are derived in
utility units. Aronsson et al. (2003), Asheim and Weitzman (2001) among others contribute
to this topic. The other critique relates to the rst best characteristic of these results. The
data for the calculation of green NNP and genuine savings is obtained from an imperfectly
functioning economy. Hence, the mismatch in Pezzey et al. (2005). Following a series
of papers from Aronsson and Lofgrën (1998, 1999) and Aronsson et al., (2003) it is clear
how the impact of external e¤ects should be taken into account in welfare measures and
sustainability concerns.
At a theoretical level one can use dynamic Pigouvian taxes to fully internalize external
e¤ects. Since dynamic Pigouvian taxes values the depletion of natural resources and e¤ects
of the representative consumer, they can also be usefull for green accounting. Usually it
has been suggested the use of willingness to pay techniques to implement Pigouvian taxes
(Aronsson and Lofgrën, 1999; Aronsson et al, 2003). This brings to discussion the problem
of not being able to desing and implement the theoretical Pigouvian tax. The problem
of small errors in the information collected through willingness to pay methods with the
objective of designing Pigouvian taxes was adressed by Aronsson et al. (2003) in the context
of the Brock model. The question is under what conditions the close to Pigouvian taxes are
welfare improving.
The main focus of this paper is twofold. First is to design Pigouvian taxes for di¤erent
kinds of environmental external e¤ects on the market economy in order to be possible to
say what is the relevant information in each situation. Second is to address the question
of the welfare e¤ects of using close to Pigouvian taxes in real economies. This is done
by considering more general conditions than those used by Aronsson et al. (2003). In
particular, we take the ecosystem dynamics as being density dependent, and not a constant
as in Aronsson et al. (2003) and we assume that there are errors in measuring both the
consumers marginal utility of nature and its regeneration rate. Additionally, we derive cost
benet rules for a green tax reform on the context of a two sector economy, in particular, a
nal good sector and a knowledge sector, considering two externalities - one environmental
externality and one technology externality.
Section 2 presents the one sector model, derives the Pigouvian taxes in di¤erent kinds of
externalities, derives the cost benet rules for a green tax reform and presents the welfare
e¤ects of using close to Pigouvian taxes. Section 3 presents the two sector dynamic economy
and its market economy version with two externalities, derives the Pigouvian taxes, the cost
benet rules for a green tax reform and the welfare e¤ects of using close to Pigouvian taxes.
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2 General Equilibrium with the Environment - One Sector
Economy
2.1 Central planners perfect economy
The economy produces one homogenous investment/consumption good, y(t), that can either
be consumed at the rate, c(t), or invested in physical capital at the rate, _k(t). Assume no
investment costs. The nal good is produced (net of depreciation) by using up physical
capital, labour l(t) (in this case we normalize the model to get l(t) = 1) and natural resources
harvested from the environment at the rate, q(t), i.e., y(t) = f(k(t); q(t)). The unperturbed
environment regenerates at the rate R(N(t)), where N(t) is the stock of natural capital
available to the economy. Hence, the dynamics of natural capital is _N(t) = R(N(t))  q(t).
The action q(t) on the environment can also be understood as pollution, or in a more general
scope as an economic impact on the environment which we choosed to name as harvest.
Assume that it is possible to dene an aggregate utility function for the representative
consumer that exhibits preferences over the consumption rate c(t) and the stock of natural
capital N(t), i.e., U(c(t); N(t)).
Assume also that there is a benevolent dictator (central planner) who whishes to max-
imize the discounted sum (using the utility discount rate, ) of U(c(t); N(t)) for all the
planning horizon (which is taken to be [0;1] 2 R), by choosing the consumption and
extraction rates. The optimal control problem is thus,
V (0;K0; N0) = max
c;q
Z 1
0
U(c(t); N(t))e tdt s.t. (1)
_k(t) = f(k(t); q(t))  c(t), (2)
_N(t) = R(N(t))  q(t), (3)
k(0) = k0;N(0) = N0; k0, N0 given. (4)
From the Pontryagins Maximum Principle we dene the following present value hamil-
tonian,
H = U(c;N)e t + p _k + p _N . (5)
The rst order necessary conditions for this problem are1,
Hc = 0, Uc = pet  , (6)
Hq = 0, fq =
p
p
, (7)
_
p
p
=  fk ,
_

=   fk , (8)
_p
p
=  U

Ne
 t
p
 R0 , _

=  R0   U

N

. (9)
along the usual transversality conditions. This set of equations implies the following system
of necessary di¤erential equations for the controls,
_Uc
Uc
=   fk (10)
_fq
fq
= fk  R0  
1
fq
UN
Uc
. (11)
1R0  dR
dN
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that, with equations (2) and (3), characterizes the optimal trajectory. The decisions con-
cerning the harvest rate are taken from equation (11). Note that rms take into account the
consumersvaluation of nature, valued at the marginal cost of harvesting or in a pollution
context, the marginal abatement costs (Hamilton, 1996; Pezzey et al, 2005).
2.2 Decentralized market economy
In a market economy there is no central planner and both the representative rm and con-
sumer have distinct optimization problems. If the set of necessary conditions characterizing
the solution of the general equilibrium of the market economy coincides with the set of nec-
essary conditions characterizing solution of the central planners economy then the market
economys equilibrium is said to be Pareto optimal.
If there are externalities it is most likely that the market economy does not have an
optimal path that is Pareto optimal. However, it is possible to control the market economy
by introducing taxes that are dened in order to the second best optimal path to be Pareto
optimal. These taxes are called dynamic Pigouvian taxes.
The market economy, to be Pareto optimal may need the introduction of government
intervention in the form of a tax and a lump-sum transfer. This is usually due to the fact
that rms when making marginal choices of the extraction rates ignore that consumers value
nature (UN 6= 0). If UN = 0 is the case, then there is no need for government intervention
to get the market economy on the Pareto optimal trajectory.
2.2.1 Representative consumers problem
There is now the question of what kind of tax is needed so that the market economy is
Pareto optimal. For instance, Pezzey (2004) considers seven tax instruments in his model:
taxes on consumption, capital, investment, resource stock and emissions. Aronsson et al.
(2004) show that for the externality referred above this could be done with an extraction
tax rate2. We consider taxes on consumption,  c, on extraction of natural resources,  q,
and on the natural capital stock, N . The problem for the representative consumer is,
max
c
Z 1
0
U(c(t); N(t))e tdt s.t.
_a = wl + da  (1 +  c)c+ T
where a is the net assets owned by the representative consumer in the form of ownership
of claims on capital or loans (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003), w is the market wage rate, l
is labour rate (we assume that the consumer o¤ers an inelastic quantity of labour equal to
one), T is a lump-sum transfer from the government, d is the market interest rate (market
capital rate of return). The set of necessary conditions for the solution of this problem is,
Uc = (1 +  c)
pet
_
p
p
=  d,
_

=   d
implying
_Uc
Uc
=   d  _ c
1 +  c
.
2The model they use is based on the Brocks model and uses the stock of pollution instead of the stock
of natural capital, and a tax on pollution emissions. Of course their model and our model have simetrical
approaches to the humansimpact on nature but the conclusions are equivalent.
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2.2.2 Representative rms problem
The rm chooses the investment rate, I(t), and the extraction rate, q(t), in order to maxi-
mize the discounted sum of its instantaneous prot
max
q;I
Z 1
0
(f(k; q)  I   NN    qq)e rtdt,
subject to,
_k = I
_N = R(N)  q;
where r is the market interest rate. The set of necessary conditions for the solution of this
problem is3,
r = fk
fq   q = pert
_p =  Ne rt   pR0:
Using these conditions we get,
_fq
fq
= r  R0   1
fq
( q(r  R0) + N   _ q).
These equation rules the choice of harvesting by the representative rm. Note that both
taxes a¤ect the rms decision to harvest while the representative consumers valuation of
nature takes no part on these decisions.
2.2.3 General equilibrium
We are assuming micro-macro consistency, i.e., ci (t) = c
(t), ai (t) = a
(t) for each consumer
i = 0; :::; S and Ij (t) = I
(t), ki (t) = k
(t), qi (t) = q
(t) for each rm j = 0; :::J . The
variables without indexes represent the aggregated values. Since the consumers hold the
capital of the rms as loans, and assuming no adjustment costs and imperfections in the
capital market then k(t) = a(t) and d(t) = r(t).
Proposition 1 The general equilibrium is given by the trajectories fc(t); q(t); k(t); N(t)g1t=0
that solve the system,
_k = f(k; q)  c (12)
_N = R(N)  q (13)
_Uc
Uc
=   fk  
_ c
1 +  c
(14)
_fq
fq
= fk  R0  
1
fq
( q(f

k  R0) + N   _ q) (15)
3The hamiltonian is H = f(k; q)  I   NN    qq + pI + p _N .
HI = 0, p = e rt
_
p
=  e rtfK .
These conditions imply r = fk .
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and for the second best optimal trajectory to be Pareto optimal it is su¢ cient that, the
production function y(t) = f(k(t); q(t)) is homogenous of degree one and,
T = fq q
,
fl = w
,
_ c = 0,
_ q =  q(f

k  R0(N) + N  
UN
Uc
:
Proof. For equation (14) to be equivalent to equation (10) it is su¢ cient that _ c = 0. In
particular the tax could be zero. Since the production function is homogenous of degree
one then, f(k; q; l) = fkk + fqq + fll, meaning that all the revenue from the rms is
distributed to the representative consumer in the form of wage wl, and prots rk+fq q
using r = fk and f

l = w
. Substituting this in the equation for _a, we obtain (12) with
 c = 0 and T = fq q. Comparing equation (15) with (11) we get the equation for _ q.
Since the Pigouvian tax on resource stock is dened in relation to the tax on extraction
it also su¢ ent, for Pareto optimality, that N = 0. From proposition 1 it can be concluded
that it is possible to internalize the e¤ect of the consumers valuation of nature on the
decision to harvest by using either a tax rate on harvesting or on natural capital stock. For
this, the Pigouvian tax, in particular requires information about consumers valuation of
nature in units of nal good.
In Aronsson et al. (2003) the rms optimization problem is static and rms ignore _N
( = 0). The tax in this case is, q = fq , meaning that the lump-sum transfer is, equal to
fq q.
We want to compare three types of externalities usually present in environmental and
resource economic models:
Case 2 (C1) There is an externality UN (= 0). Meaning that rms when choosing the
optimal extraction rate ignore the consumers valuation of natural capital services.
Case 3 (C2) The rms take the shadow value of natural capital equal to zero ( = 0)
(Adapted from Aronsson et al. (2003)). This means that rms ignore natural capital
dynamics and consumers valuation of nature when making marginal decisions about the
extraction rate.
Case 4 (C3) There is an externality UN and additionally rms take R0(N) = 0 (adapted
from Pezzey (1995)). This means that rms take natures unperturbed dynamics as constant
(unrenewable) in the optimal decisions to extract.
Let us now determine the dynamic Pigouvian taxes in these three cases. Starting with
C1, the market economy optimization problem can be written as
V (0;K0; N0) = max
c;q
Z 1
0
U(c; N)e tdt s.t. (16)
_k = f(k; q)  c   qq + T , (17)
_N = R(N)  q, (18)
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where N is taken as constant. From the maximum principle we have that the second best
optimal path is characterized by equations in proposition 1. So, the dynamic Pigouvian tax
is dened in proposition 1 with N = 0. This can be solved to give
 q(t) =
Z 1
t
UN (s)
Uc (s)
e 
R s
t f

k () R0()dds. (19)
So, the tax at each instant is the discounted sum, in the planning horizon, of consumers
marginal preferences towards nature in monetary (consumption) units, where the discount
term depends negatively (and exponentially) on fk   R0. If fk > R0 then the tax goes
exponentially to zero following the second best path; on the other hand, if fk < R
0 then,
along the second best path, the tax increases exponentially. The information requirements
to implement this tax are innite! Information from future marginal utility of ecosystem
services in nal goods units (note that the marginal utility of consumption is also changing)
is needed, along with information on future natural capitals marginal rate of regeneration
and future capital rate of return.
Considering case C3, the market economy optimization problem is given by equations
(16), (17) and
_N = R( N)  q. (20)
Following the Pontryagins maximum principle the second best optimal path is given by
equations, (12), (14), (20) and
_fq ()
fq ()
= fk () 
 qf

k ()  _ q
fq ()
. (21)
Thus, for the second best path to be Pareto optimal it is su¢ cient that
_ q =  qf

k () 

fq ()R0() +
UN ()
Uc ()

, (22)
which can be solved, yielding
 q(t) =
Z 1
t

UN (s)
Uc(s)
+ fq (s)R
0(s)

e 
R s
t f

k ()dds, or
 q(t) =
Z 1
t
UN (s)
Uc(s)
e 
R s
t f

k ()dds+
Z 1
t
fq (s)R
0(s)e 
R s
t f

k ()dds:
In this case, the Pigouvian resource extraction tax is the sum of two "taxes", one that
equals the Pigouvian tax of an exhaustible resource externality (equation (22) with R0 = 0)
and the other accounts for the external indirect e¤ect of impacts on marginal production
of harvested resources due to changes in the marginal growth rate of natural capital. The
discount term depends only on the marginal productivity of physical capital.
The optimal control problem of the market economy with an externality like C2 is the
optimization problem given by equations (16) and (17)4. The necessary conditions dening
the second best path for this market economy are _Uc = Uc (  fk ) and fq =  q. This
implies that _fq = _ q, so, for the second best path to be Pareto optimal it is su¢ cient that
_ q =  q
 
fk  R0
  UN
Uc
, (23)
4This is equivalent to the market economy in Aronsson et al. (2003) where the rm faces a static prot
optimization problem.
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which gives the Pigouvian tax dened in equation (19). In another way, following Aronsson
et al. (2003), for second best path to be Pareto optimal it is su¢ cient that  q = p=Uc, where
p follows equation (9) and N follows equation (3). This is implies that the Pigouvian tax
is,
 q(t) =
1
Uc (t)
Z 1
t
UN (s)e
 se
R s
t R
0()dds. (24)
which is equivalent to the Pigouvian tax for the case C1. This can be noted by solving
equation (10) and subsitute the solution in equation (19). The tax in equation (19) is
the Pigouvian tax for externalities in case C1 and C2. From this we can conclude that
externalities C1 and C2 are equivalent.
For these three environmental external e¤ects, the informational requirements are iden-
tical and not easily solved. It is necessary to obtain information about future marginal
utilities and marginal regeneration rate of natural capital, along with information about
man-made capital rates of return. As discussed in the introduction, this is an interesting
link between contingent valuation methods or willingness to pay techniques and theoretical
models of dynamic economies. From dynamic economies it is easy to design Pigouvian
taxes that state the information requirements very clearly. This gives solid foundation for
the use of such empirical valuation studies. However, as stated before, this information
is impossible to obtain in real economies, and tax designers have to deal with defective
information, either because when applying contingent valuation methods the consumers do
not state the correct value for any reason, or because the Pigouvian taxes require contin-
uous information. The problem of not having information continuously was addressed in
Aronsson et al. (2003) and they concluded that an approximation to Pigouvian taxes could
be used by collecting information from time to time, depending on the interval between
willingness-to-pay information. Here we address the problem of misestimation errors in a
way that generalizes Aronsson et al. (2003) ndings. Before this, a cost benet rule for a
green tax reform is needed.
2.3 Cost benet rule for a tax change
In this section we examine the welfare implications of using a non-Pigouvian tax to con-
trol the economy. As discussed above we have informational problems calculating Pigouvian
taxes, whether from not knowing the real future marginal utility of ecosystem, or the ecosys-
tem dynamics. Hence, in this section we derive the cost-benet rule for a small change in the
ecosystem harvest tax and analyze its welfare improving compared with the uncontrolled
market by using a close to Pigouvian tax where the used marginal utility from ecosystem
stock and its marginal rate of regeneration have a time dependent bias to the real values.
Consider here that the external e¤ect is such that rms take the shadow price of natural
capital as zero. Assume that there is an increase by a small positive constant , so the tax
is now  q(t) + . In this case, we consider the optimal value function to be,
V (0; ) =
Z 1
0
U(c(t; ); N(t; ))e tdt
where  is a vector of parameters including . The welfare e¤ect of the tax change is given
by @V (0; )=@. This expression is a dynamic cost benet rule for a tax change (Aronsson
et al., 2003) and it can be obtained by using the dynamic envelope theorem (LaFrance
and Barney, 1991). The cost benet rule is obtained by di¤erentianting V (0; ) w.r.t. 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and evaluate the resulting derivative along the initial (second best) optimal path using the
necessary conditions and (t) = 0 (Aronsson et al., 2003).
Proposition 5 The dynamic cost benet rule for a tax change  q(t) + , with , a small
positive constant, is
@V (0; )
@
=
Z 1
0
UN ()Ne t + pfq ()qdt.
Proof. Dene the present value hamiltonian-like function, H = U()e t + p _k, where
p does not depend on . With this, the value function can be written as
V (0; ) =
Z 1
0
H   p _kdt.
Integrating by parts the second term we obtain,
V (0; ) =
Z 1
0
H + _
p
kdt  pk j10
Taking the derivative w.r.t. , the term @pk j10 =@ is zero since, limt!1
p(t) = 0, k0 is
xed and p does not depend on . Hence,
@V (0; )
@
=
Z 1
0
@ H
@
+ _
p@k
@
dt:
@ H
@
= (Uc ()c + UN ()N) e t + p
 
fkk

 + f

q q

   c

,
where we make use of equation (12). For simplicity, we use the notation where the subscript
 in c means @c=@.
H + _
p
k = U

N ()Ne t + p
 
fk ()k + fq ()q

+ _
p
k = U

N ()Ne t + pfq ()q
where the rst equality comes from using Uc = 
pet, and the second equality from using
_
p
=  pfk . Hence we obtain the dynamic cost benet rule.
This is equivalent to the cost benet rule derived in Aronsson and Löfgren (1999) and
Aronsson et al. (2004) but now applied to an ecosystem harvesting tax and generalized
to include the natural capitals density dependent dynamics. The second term of the cost
benet rule represents the cost of the loss of consumption due to a decrease in the ecosystem
resources harvested (due to an increase in the harvest tax), and the rst term the utility
gains due to an increase in natural capital. Since fq =  q and since it can be easily proved
that N > 0 then if the tax is zero the welfare e¤ect is positive. This means that introducing
a small tax in the market economy is welfare improving. Note that, since q < 0 if the tax
rate is too high then decreasing the tax rate is welfare improving, implying that there is an
interval for welfare improving tax rates.
What happens to the cost benet rule if the Pigouvian tax is wrongly implemented?
Extending Aronsson et al. (2003) case, we consider measurement errors both in the mar-
ginal utility of natural capital as, UN (c(t); N(t)) + (t) and in its marginal rate of natural
regeneration as, R0(N(t)) + (t).
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Proposition 6 Consider measurement errors (t) and (t) in the marginal utiliy of natural
capital UN (c(t); N(t)) and in the natural rate of regeneration of natural capital R0(N(t)),
respectively. Then, the dynamic cost benet rule can be written as
@V (0; )
@
=  
Z 1
0
N(t)

p(t) q(t)(t) + (t)e
 t dt.
Proof. Deriving w.r.t.  the equation for the dynamics of the natural capital in cases C1
or C2 implies q = R0()N   _N, which, substituting in the cost benet rule (CBR) in
proposition 5 gives,
@V (0; )
@
=
Z 1
0
UN ()Ne t + pfq ()

R0()N   _N

dt.
Now, integrating the term   R10 pfq () _Ndt by parts we obtainZ 1
0

_
p
fq () + p _fq ()

Ndt  pfq ()N j10 .
Since lim
t!1
p(t) = 0 and N0 is xed then the last term in the last expression is zero. With
_
p
=  pfk this expression then becomesZ 1
0
pN

_fq ()  fk ()fq ()

dt.
Using this, the CBR can be written as
@V (0; )
@
=
Z 1
0
UN ()Ne t + pNfq ()
"
_fq ()
fq ()
   fk () R0()
#
dt.
Now using equation (15) the CBR is
@V (0; )
@
=
Z 1
0
UN ()Ne t + pN

 q
 
R0()  fk ()

+ _ q

dt.
The non-Pigouvian tax here considered solves
_ q =  q
 
fk () R0()  
  UN () + 
p
e t
using equation (23) and Uc () = pet. Substituting this in the CBR we obtain the cost
benet rule desired.
Note that if measurement errors were both zero, then the tax change produces no wel-
fare e¤ects, meaning that the tax internalises the environmental externality. If both the
measured marginal utility from the ecosystem and of marginal ecosystem productivity over-
estimate the true respective values, then a permanent small increase in the harvest tax
reduces the welfare level. By the same token, reducing the harvest tax is welfare improving
in this case. On the other hand, if we underestimate the marginal ecosystem productiv-
ity and we have  uN <  <  p q5, then increasing the harvest tax is always welfare
improving.
5This means that we have a tax and not a subsidy.
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An interesting e¤ect is that there is the possibility of tradeo¤s between the estimates to
generate welfare improving increases in the harvest tax. If, for instance, we are overestimat-
ing the ecosystem marginal productivity, for the controlled economy to be welfare superior
to the uncontrolled we need to underestimate the marginal utility from the ecosystem. From
this it can be concluded that it is not relevant to put all the e¤ort on obtaining measures
of marginal utility when no e¤ort is put in understanding the way ecosystems work, in
particular the marginal rate of regeneration is needed. Additionally, note the term related
to mis-estimations of the marginal utility from ecosystem services is being discounted ac-
cording to the representative consumers discount rate. This implies that this term looses
powerin comparing to the terms a¤ected by errors in the mis-estimation of marginal rates
of ecosystem regeneration when computing welfare e¤ects of a tax change. This means
that in a sense the errors made in measuring ecosystem growth rates have persistent wel-
fare e¤ects, and ought to be taken more seriously than marginal utilities from ecosystem
services.
3 General Equilibrium with the Environment - Two Sector
Economy
In this section we introduce knowledge formation in the model analysed in the previous
section. The objective is, to understand the e¤ects and interactions among two externalities
and two close to Pigouvian taxes.
The dynamic economy is composed of two sectors. One is the nal good sector and
the other is a pure investment R&D sector that produces knowledge about the e¢ cient
allocation of harvest resources to production. As in the above sections, we derive the cost
benet rules for the case of a green tax reform with the implementation of a close-to-
Pigouvian tax with measurement errors. We also explore the relations of the Pigouvian
taxes with welfare measures in the market economy.
3.1 The perfect economy with knowledge formation
The environment is modeled as a renewable resource and the economic actions on the
environment are taken to be a negative e¤ect on the environment dynamics, interpreted
either as resources harvested or as polluting, using equation (3). The nal goods sector
produces a nal output that can either be consumed at rate c(t) or invested for physical
capital accumulation. The nal good y(t) is produced by using the fraction, u(t), of man-
made capital allocated to production, u(t)k(t)  Ky (where k(t) includes physical and
human capital excluding knowledge capital related to harvest), and by using the share (t)
of e¤ective input of harvested resources, (t)h(t)q(t)  Qy, i.e., y(t) = f (Ky; Qy). The
amount of harvesting necessary for the production of the nal good depends on the state
of the knowledge of harvesting-augmenting techniques, depicted by h(t).
The knowledge sector is a pure investment sector that produces knowledge about tech-
niques related to the allocation of harvested resources. To this end, the knowledge sec-
tor uses as inputs, the physical capital, KH  (1   u(t))k(t), and e¤ective harvested re-
sources, QH  (1  (t))h(t)q(t), i.e. the dynamics of the technical knowledge stock is
_h = H (KH ; QH).
The economy encompasses a usual accumulation equation that links the evolution of the
11
stock of economy-wide physical capital to investment, y   c,
_k = y   c.
Additionally the economy obeys the resource constraints, k = Ky +Kh with u  Ky=k
and Q = Qy +QH ,with  = Qy=Q. The representative consumer exhibits preferences over
consumption goods and environmental stock, so that the central planner chooses the con-
sumption rate, the harvest rate and the shares of man-made capital and pollution allocated
to the nal goods and knowldge sectors, i.e.
V (0; k0; N0) = max
c;q;u;
Z 1
0
U(c;N)e tdt s.t. (25)
_k = f (uk; hq)  c, (26)
_N = R(N)  q, (27)
_h = H ((1  u)k; (1  )hq) , (28)
k(0) = k0; N(0) = N0; h(0) = h0; k0, N0, h0 given. (29)
where the time is supressed for clarity. This model is a particular case of the model analised
in Bovenberg and Smulders (1995). The present value hamiltonian for this problem is
H = U(c;N)e t + p _k + p _N + p _h.
The conditions for the static optimal allocation are,
pfKy = 
pHKH , (30)
pfQy = 
pHQH , (31)
fQyh =
p
p
, HQHh =
p
p
. (32)
The rts (second) condition states that the marginal product of physical capital (e¤ective
harvest) should be the same in both sectors measured in units of physical capital. The third
equation states that for both sectors, the product of one additional unit of harvest resources
equals its marginal cost in terms of deterioration of the environmental stock (Bovenberg
and Smulders, 1995).
The conditions for the optimal dynamic allocation are,
_
p
p
=  fKy =  
p
p
HKH , (33)
_p
p
=   UN
pet
 R0, (34)
_p
p
=  HQHq =  
p
p
fQy . (35)
The rst equation along with the rst order condition for the static optimization of the
consumption rate gives the usual Ramsey rule for dynamic e¢ ciency in the trade-o¤between
consumption and investment in each sector as in equation (10). The other two equations for
the shadow prices of natural capital and knowledge stock give arbitrage conditions implying
that the h and N should yield the same return (Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995). Rewriting
this equations using the current value shadow prices it is obviously seen that, as usual in
dynamic growth models, the global rate of return of the assets considered, which includes
capital gains (change in the shadow price) and the asset specic rate of return, should be
equal to the representative consumers discount rate.
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3.2 Externalities in the decentralized market economy
The conditions presented in the last subsection serve as a benchmark in order to obtain
the Pigouvian taxes in a second best world. Here we shall consider two externalities - one
environmental externality and one technological externality. The environmental externality
considered here is the same as case C2 meaning that rms take the shadow price of nature
as being zero and overpollute (Aronsson et al., 2003). The external e¤ect of the knowledge
sector considered here is similar in the sense that the nal goods sector is assumed to ignore
the dynamics of the knowledge sector, which a¤ects the optimal allocation of physical capital
between sectors. So in the imperfect market economy the shadow price of the knowledge
stock h is taken as zero. We may interpret this as being an external benet to the nal
goods sector that is freely using green technology.
In order to internalize these two external e¤ects, various sets of taxes could be used and
here we choose the usual tax rate on harvest resources  q, and to internalize the technological
externality we consider a tax (or subsidy) on the fraction of man-made capital that should
be devoted to the knowledge sector, u. Other taxes could be considered though they do
not add to the cost benet rules and welfare e¤ects derived below.
Assume that the technical knowledge is produced by using only man-made capital,
so that _h = H ((1  u)k). This simplies the analysis and does not changes the main
conclusions for the welfare e¤ects of tax changes. In a market economy with these two
external e¤ects, the conditions for the second-best optimal path can be derived from the
present value Hamiltonian
H^ = U()e t + p  f (uk; hq)  c q q   uu+ T 
As seen above, the representative consumer chooses the consumption rate of nal goods
in order to maximize its discounted sum of utilities and the rms of the nal good sector
maximizes their prots in an environment of perfect competition. Hence, the conditions for
the second-best optimum include,
Uc = 
pet, (36)
fKyk = u, (37)
fQyh =  q. (38)
for the static optimal allocation, and _
p
=  pfKy for the optimal dynamic allocation. In
this imperfect market economy the decisions to extract are taken from equation (38)
Proposition 7 For the second best optimal trajectory to be Pareto optimal it is su¢ cient
that the taxes are designed as follows
_ q =  q
 
fKy  R0
  UN
Uc
, (39)
_u = u
 
fKy +
_HKH
HKH
+
_k
k
!
  fQyqHKHk. (40)
Proof. As in the one sector models, taking the time derivative of the second best static
optimal conditions and using the conditions for the optimal dynamic allocation of the rst
best solution we obtain the expressions for the Pigouvian taxes.
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3.3 Cost benet rule for a tax change
The pupose of this section is to examine , close to Pigouvian taxes improve the welfare level
when comparing with the uncontrolled market economy as done in Aronsson et al. (2003).
For this matter consider a green tax reform as in the one sector model, so that the harvest
tax rate is now,  q(t) + . With this, a cost benet rule for the tax change is derived and
from this cost benet rule the conditions under which the close to Pigouvian taxes improve
welfare are derived. The method followed is the same for the one sector model and the cost
benet rule is
Proposition 8 The dynamic cost benet rule for an innitesimal tax change in the two
sector economy is
@V (0; )
@
=
Z 1
0
UNNe
 t + p[uu +  qq]  p
 
fKy (1  u) k + fQyhq

dt. (41)
Proof. The proof follows that of proposition 5 applied to the two sector market economy.
See appendix A.
The rst term of the integral is the utility value of an increase of natural capital stock due
to an increase in the harvest tax rate. The term inside square brackets can be understood
as an e¤ect on the preexisting tax system. This accounts for the erosion of the tax base,
meaning the e¤ects of the tax reform () on q and u. The term in curve brackets represent
the additional e¤ects of the tax reform in terms of forgone consumption of goods due to
a decrease in the harvested resources (second term inside square brackets) and due to
the indirect e¤ect of a¤ecting the marginal productivity of physical capital due to the
technological externality. This is the e¤ect of  on physical capital and knowledge along
the general equilibrium path.
Note that increasing the harvest tax increases the cost of a unit of harvest, hence given
the assumptions of the underlying model q < 0 for all t. From this, N > 0, implying that
the rst term is benet due to better environmental quality. The signs of the terms involving
the equilibrium responses in u, h and k cannot be determined a priori. If k < 0 for all t, then
the increase in the environmental tax produces, as opposite to Aronsson (1999), a welfare
benet via the additional distortion of the capital stock, and this e¤ect is more pronounced
the higher the share of physical capital devoted to the knowledge (green technology) sector
along the general equilibrium. The last term is explicitly tracking the e¤ect of an alteration
of the technology in the marginal productivity of harvested resources and ultimately in the
harvest rate, to the green tax reform. If h > 0 then this term is a welfare cost due in terms
of the productivity of a unit of resource harvested and consenquently in terms of foregone
consumption.
Now to answer the question of what are the welfare e¤ects of using close to Pigouvian
taxes consider that there are measurement errors in the marginal utility of natural capital
and in its marginal regeneration rate (as in the one sector model) and additionally assume
measurement errors in implementing the knowledge tax rate, specically in the measurement
of the marginal productivity of harvested resources fQy+" (since the technology is considered
an externality).
Proposition 9 Considering measurement errors as in proposition 6, and additionally that
fQy +" in the tax rate associated to the tax u, the dynamic cost benet rule can be written
as
@V (0; )
@
=  
Z 1
0
p(t)fh(t)q(t)"(t) +N(t) q(t)(t)g+N(t)(t)e tdt (42)
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Proof. This proof follows very closely the proof of proposition 6. Derive w.r.t.  the
equations for _h and _N and substitute these in the above cost benet rule. Integrate by
parts the terms having _h and _N and use the rst order conditions for the two sector
market economy. Now, since the close to Pigouvian taxes obey
_ q =  q
 
fKy  R0
  UN
Uc
   q   e
 t
p
,
_u = u
 
fKy +
_HKH
HKH
+
_k
k
!
   fQy + " qHKHk,
substituting them in the resulting cost benet rule and obtain the result of this proposition.
This approach allows for the inclusion of various kinds of errors when implementing
Pigouvian taxes. This proposition is a generalization of the cost benet analysis performed
in Aronsson et al. (2003) to include measurement errors in both the Pigouvian harvest
tax rate and the technology tax rate. Note that, since N > 0 it is known that the last
term increases welfare (in case of a green tax reform) if we underestimate the true value
of the marginal utility of ecosystem services for the representative consumer, as compared
to the uncontrolled market economy. Again, note that this term is being discounted. Most
likely the e¤ects of misestimating future marginal utilities are smaller than the e¤ects of
mis-estimating ecosystem regeneration rates and the marginal productivity of harvested
resources, which include the e¤ects of using green technology h.
Again, there is a tradeo¤ between errors in the measurement of specic terms in the
implementation of the Pigouvian taxes but now including welfare e¤ects via the use of
green technology in handling the harvested resources when producing the consumption
good. However, as it can be seen from the cost benet rule in proposition 9 it is always
possible to design welfare improving taxes.
Moreover, this cost benet rules gives interesting indications of how to proceed in de-
signing Pigouvian taxes in the real world. For instance, it can be seen that if we have data
on some term of the Pigouvian tax that we know is an under(over)-estimation of the true
value, according to propositions 9 and 6 we could assert what the impact of data on other
variables would be, and the relevance of it in terms of welfare, thus yielding guidelines for
the practical implementation of theoretically dened Pigouvian taxes.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we designed Pigouvian taxes for di¤erent kinds of externalities in one and two
sector dynamic economies. Moreover, we analized the cost benet rules of a (innitesimal)
green tax reform in a more general context than Aronsson et al. (2003). From the Pigouvian
tax derived it is possible to know exactly what are the information requirements for the
implementation in real economies. Since the data collected to implement these taxes is
not perfect for a variety of reasons, we analized the welfare e¤ects of errors in estimating
certain quantities used in the Pigouvian taxes. We found conditions for which the denition
of non-Pigouvian taxes is welfare improving for the controlled economy in comparison to the
uncontrolled. We focused particularly on the e¤ects of mis-estimating marginal utility from
ecosystem services and the marginal ecosystem productivity for the one sector model and
additionally the marginal productivity of harvested resources when using green technology
in the two sector dynamic economy. The two sector model is an endogenous growth model
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where we considered the interaction of two externalities - one environmental and another
related to the available technology.
Our analysis of non-Pigouvian taxes generalized Aronsson et al. (2004) work in various
ways. First we considered a more general ecosystem dynamics, second we considered wrong
estimates for the marginal ecosystem productivity, third we considered cost benet rules in
a context of a two sector dynamic economy.
The main conclusion is that even when we consider misestimates of the marginal ecosys-
tem productivity it is always possible to design welfare improving tax changes, in comparison
to the uncontrolled market economy. This is true for both the one sector and two sector
market economies. Another interesting conclusion is that, in a sense, we derived guidelines
for the implementation of Pigouvian taxes, particularly concerning the approach to the
obtained data from real imperfect economies. This approach provides useful tools for the
design of Pigouvian taxes in real economies.
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6 Appendix A
Proof of proposition 8. We have assumed that the externalities on these model imply
that  =  = 0 in the economy composed of equations (25) - (29). Thus, assume that
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H = U()e t + p _k. With this, the value function rewrites as
V (0; ) =
Z 1
0
H   p _kdt.
Taking the derivative w.r.t. , integrating by parts and noting that lim
t!1
p(t) = 0, k0 is
xed and p does not depend on  we get
@V (0; )
@
=
Z 1
0
H + _
p
kdt.
H = U

NN

e
 t + p

fKy (uk + uk) + fQy (hq + hq)

,
where we make use of p = Uce t and the equation for _k.
H + _
p
k = U

NN

e
 t + p

fKy (uk   (1  u) k) + fQy (hq + hq)

,
making use of use _
p
=  pfk . Substituting in the integral,
@V (0; )
@
=
Z 1
0
UNNe
 t + p

fKy (uk   (1  u) k) + fQy (hq + hq)

dt, (A1)
which rearranging and using equations (37) and (38) gives the CBR desired.
Proof of proposition 9. Deriving w.r.t.  the equation for the dynamics of the natural
capital and of the knowledge stock implies q = R0N   _N and (uk   (1  u) k) =
  _hHKH , respectively. Substituting in the CBR we obtain,
@V (0; )
@
=
Z 1
0
UNNe
 t + p
"
fKy
 
 
_h
HKH
!
+ fQy

hq + h

R0N   _N
#
dt.
Integrating by parts the term  pfKy

  _hHKH

, noting that lim
t!1
p(t) = 0, k0 and h0
is xed and p does not depend on , and using the second best conditions for the shadow
price of capital, then,
 
Z 1
0
pfKy
 
 
_h
HKH
!
dt =
Z 1
0
h
p
HKHk
"
_u   u
 
fKy +
_HKH
HKH
+
_k
k
!#
dt.
By the same token the following holds,
 
Z 1
0
pfQyh _Ndt =
Z 1
0
pN

_ q   fKy q

dt.
Substituting these expressions in the CBR we obtain,
@V (0; )
@
=
Z 1
0
UNNe
 t +
h
p
HKHk
"
_u   u
 
fKy +
_HKH
HKH
+
_k
k
!
+ fQyqHKHk
#
+
+pN

 q
 
R0   fKy

+ _ q

dt.
Now substituting the close to Pigouvian taxes in this expression we prove our result.
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